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THREE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES





We construct a Neo-Keynesian model, with a standard utility specification and nominal 
rigidities, in which monopolistic firms have employment-related norms and the wage 
bargaining power is variable. Due to norms, firms hire workers in excess of the 
number of employees required by technology. Workers in excess are efficiency 
reserves of the firms. We present the implications for the unemployment-inflation 
trade-off. We show that, with norms and variable bargaining power, besides the 
natural rate of unemployment, the unemployment rate at which firms establish/cancel 
norms, and the one at which the labor bargaining power reach maximum are relevant 
to decision making We show that, in the presence of norms, the response of the 
unemployment rate to a change in the monetary policy stance is relatively large, and 
temporarily concomitant increases in the unemployment rate and inflation can occur.  
1. Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy is guided by several fundamental principles, two of 
which refer to money neutrality. One of the two principles, attributed to Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1968) shows that, in the long run, there is no trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment, as money is neutral. The second principle states that 
monetary policy can exploit the negative relation between inflation and unemployment 
in the short term. The standard Neo-Keynesian model (the NK model, for short), which 
plays an essential role in the conduct of monetary policy, incorporates these 
principles, but it does not include adjustments in the unemployment rate (Blanchard, 
2008). Blanchard and Gali (2008) extended the NK model by introducing the labor 
market with frictions and sticky wages. This change allows for characterizing the 
effects of productivity shocks on inflation and unemployment and how they depend on 
monetary policy and on the nature of labor market frictions. 
This paper extends the NK model by allowing the following characteristics of the labor 
market: (i) part of the employees has key qualifications for the firm’s own niche, and 
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the other part performs auxiliary activities; (ii) only workers with key qualifications have 
wage bargaining power; (iii) the wage bargaining power of employees and firms is 
variable; and (iv) firms have norms regarding the adequate number of auxiliary 
workers. Due to these norms, the number of workers performing auxiliary activities 
exceeds the number of workers required by technology. Workers in excess constitute 
efficiency reserves of a firm. By adding nominal rigidities, we derive a negative relation 
between inflation and the unemployment rate. Setting or cancelling norms by firms 
influence this relation through shocks in employment and labor productivity. Likewise, 
under certain conditions and only temporarily, a large wage bargaining power of labor 
could cause the unemployment rate to increase without a fall in inflation. We discuss 
what monetary policy should do in this case. 
The paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents the model, leaving nominal rigidities in price and wage setting 
aside. Firms establish norms when aggregate demand is high enough for the 
unemployment rate,  t u , to drop below a relevant level,  nor u . Norms and efficiency 
reserves can be removed by a fall in aggregate demand so that  nor t u u t  or by a 
supply shock. Given the output level, the presence or the absence of norms is 
reflected in either lower or higher unemployment. When norms are in place, the 
unemployment rate is lower by 
t
xef u  as compared to its level when norms are not 
present. Consequently, the response of the unemployment rate to a certain change in 
production is larger if norms are in place as compared to the situation in which they 
are not. The response magnitude changes with the cycle, whenever aggregate 
demand fluctuations cause the unemployment rate to move below or above the 
threshold nor u .
Bargaining power depends on the aggregate demand and can be expressed in terms 
of the unemployment rate. In the presence of norms, employees have maximum 
bargaining power at a low unemployment rate,  min u . If there were no norms, the 
unemployment rate would be 
1
min u , which is higher than  min u  with the efficiency 
reserves. The firm has maximum bargaining power at an unemployment rate that is 
sufficiently high,  nor max u u t
3. Thus, changes in demand determine bargaining power 
transfers between workers and firms within the interval >@ max min u , u  if norms are in 
place or within the smaller interval > @ max min u u ,
1  otherwise. The natural rate of 
unemployment (
* u ) lies within these intervals. 
The labor force demand equation results from the price setting behavior of 
monopolistic firms. The labor force supply equation results from a Nash-bargaining. 
Both processes depend only on the real wage. The resulting wage is the bargained 
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notional wage. The supply equation shows that the real notional wage increases when 
the unemployment rate falls
4. The equilibrium wage is reached at the natural rate of 
unemployment and maximizes unitary surpluses of both firms and employees. The 
natural unemployment rate does not depend on norms. But when norms are in place, 
the unemployment rate gap consists of a classical demand-related unemployment rate 
gap, which reflects demand’s excess or deficit, and of a norms-related component. 
Section 3 shows that, in the presence of norms, if 
* xef *
t u u u  d  and 
* u is sufficiently 
close to  min u , a temporary alternative wage setting mechanism can occur. This 
happens if workers decide to use their bargaining power in order to increase the real 
wage beyond the notional wage and the representative firm responds by shedding 
excess workers to preserve its surplus per labor unit. Information asymmetry and 
inflation expectations could trigger such a decision by workers. If so decided, the real 
wage, labor productivity and the unemployment rate rise simultaneously, leaving the 
demand-related unemployment gap, and thus the real marginal cost gap, unchanged.
Section 4 introduces sticky prices in the model. On this basis we derive the Neo-
Keynesian relation between current inflation, expected inflation and the expected real 
marginal cost gap, which, in this model, depends on the unemployment rate. We show 
that, when in place, norms alter monetary policy effects on this relation. In particular, a 
change in monetary policy stance produces a relatively high change in the 
unemployment rate. We also show that the temporary alternative wage setting 
mechanism leads to an increase in the unemployment rate without a fall in inflation. 
According to the two fundamental principles, monetary policy can bring the 
unemployment rate back to the level registered before shedding excess workers by 
firms only temporarily and at the cost of higher inflation. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
2.1. Assumptions 
Preferences
The representative household is made up of a continuum of members normalized to 1. 
The proportion of the representative household members which are employed by firms 
is L , whereas leisure or unemployment is  L u    1 . The preferences of the 
representative household are defined over a composite consumption good  t C  and 
leisure. Each member of the household maximizes the expected present value of 
utility
                                                          
4 The results of empirical studies dealing with the relation between wages and the 
unemployment rate are mixed. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have shown that there is a 
strong correlation between wages and unemployment in the USA. By contrast, Blanchard and 
Katz (1997) have shown, by analyzing regressions for the states of the USA, that there is a 
correlation between nominal wages and unemployment, but that the wage dependency on 
unemployment is low and wages are more dependent on their previous levels. Institute for Economic Forecasting






























where: V is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of households and I is the 
inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply. 
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where: E  is the price elasticity of demand and satisfies the condition  1 ! E .
The representative household decides to purchase that combination of individual 
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where: jt p  is the price of the good  j . Solving this problem, one can obtain the 
demand ( j c ) for each consumption good j :

E    t t t t j p p C c /  (2) 
In equation (2), p  stands for the economy-wide average price level, whereas p  is 
the average production price of a firm. The ratio 
E 
t t p p / gives the negative 
slope of the demand for the firm’s products.
The aggregated budgetary constraint of the consumer is 
   t t t t t t t t t p B r L p W p B C 1 1 1         (3) 
where: t W  is the economy-wide average nominal wage,  t B  is the nominal value of 
the bonds owned by consumers and  t r is the interest rate. Relations (1) and (3) give 
the inter-temporal optimality condition which establishes the marginal rate of 
substitution between leisure and consumption: 
t t t t p W C L  
V I F  (4)  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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Technology 
Each monopolistically competitive firm produces a differentiated final good  j . All firms 
have access to an identical technology, which is assumed to vary exogenously over 
time. Given this technology, each firm requires a number of employees with key 
qualifications for its own market niche (
np L ) and a number of workers who are 
auxiliary to the production process (
sb L ). The unemployment rates 
np u  and 
sb u  match 












P u u u    . Due to 





sb L c L    (5) 
Thus,
t







P L c u L       1 1 , with  0 ! p c  (6) 
and the production ( t Y ), equal to consumption  t C , is directly proportional to the 






p xef t L c Y    1 K  (7) 
where: xef K  is labor productivity, which we assume to be constant.
Norms 
Our hypothesis is that firms’ anticipation of long-lasting good economic prospects is 
matched by a reduction in their rationality regarding employment. When economic 
perspectives are favorable, during the upturn of the business cycle, firms establish 
norms (in the sense described by Akerlof, 2007) regarding the ‘adequate’ number of 
auxiliary workers
5, making the actual number of auxiliary workers systematically larger 
than
t
sb L . Let 
t
xef u  be the number of workers in excess of the number of workers 
required by technology. Thus, given the aggregate demand, firms set a new ‘normal’ 
                                                          
5 Norms are established in relation with workers performing routine activities and not with those 
with key qualifications for the firm’s own niche because the relation between the former and 
technology is less strict. For example, a software firm can function with 50 programmers, each 
using a computer. Technology requires two hardware engineers to solve the problems that 
may arise when using the computers. Yet, the firm and workers can agree that it is safer to 
hire four hardware engineers. Obviously, the workload is larger when using only two 
engineers. Institute for Economic Forecasting
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level of unemployment,
t
R L , and a corresponding new ‘normal’ rate of unemployment, 
t






R u u u     (8) 
where: 0 !
xef u . Equation (8) shows that the (new ‘normal’) unemployment rate when 
norms are in place, 
t
R u , is lower than the (old ‘normal’) unemployment rate, 
t
P u ,
with excess workers 
t
xef u . Being in excess, the personnel 
xef u  do not influence the 
output level, but diminish labor productivity, thus representing firms’ efficiency 
reserves. Likewise, 
t
xef u can be interpreted as a ‘comfort rate’ enjoyed by both 
employees and government
6.
Firms establish norms when aggregate demand is high enough for the number of 
employees with key qualifications to exceed a relevant level 
np
nor L , so that the 




nor nor u u u    , which in view of equation (6) means that  nor t u u   whenever 
np
nor t
np u u  . Relative to the new ‘normal’ level of unemployment, firms are rational 




However, firms come to regard the excess workers 
xef u  as efficiency reserves in two 
cases. First, when demand falls sufficiently so that  nor t u u t . As can be deducted 





p u c L c '     '  1 1  reflects a change in 
                                                          
6 If the firm did not hire excess workers, the latter would receive unemployment benefits smaller 
than their wages, thus increasing government expenditures. Because  1   u L , the ratio 

xef xef u u L u    .
7  In addition to the result induced by norms, a firm can also hire excess workers if it anticipates 
a significant increase in demand. Hiring personnel is difficult when demand increases at 
relatively high rates. Firms build up personnel “reserves” from both categories in order to be 
prepared to respond to increasing demand. But these reserves are temporary. They run out as 
demand increases and firms use personnel reserves to produce more. Thus, they are not 
efficiency reserves of firms. It is reasonable to assume that at the natural rate of 
unemployment or at a smaller rate, firms have used up these personnel reserves. We agree 
with John Vickers (1995), who found a trade-off between the costs of having slacks and the 
cost of risk. If the future payment is related to a performance ratio, it would be best for a 
manager to act inefficiently now in order to maintain the potential for achieving future gains 
with average efforts. In our view, there is no contradiction between this approach and the 
neoclassical theory.  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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aggregate demand. Second, if firms face a supply shock (z ) that forces them to 
dismiss excess workers, or, in other words, to use the efficiency reserves.
A supply shock can change the way a firm perceives the number of employees if it 
has the power to ‘unveil’ the efficiency reserves. In our view, a shock has this power if 
it reduces the surplus per worker left to the firm. Such a shock forces the firm to 
cancel norms and use the efficiency reserves in order to preserve its surplus or to 
minimize a reduction of it. Thus,  z is equal to 1 if there is a negative supply shock that 
forces a firm to cancel norms and use its efficiency reserves and is equal to zero 
otherwise.
We define  
xef u  as a constant fraction ( xef c ) of the minimum number of auxiliary 
workers hired after firms established norms. Thus, if  0   z  and  nor t u u  , 0 ! xef c .





np u u u 1    ),
t
xef u  can be written as
t
np
t xef p t
np
nor t xef p t
xef u z c hc u z c c u '     '     ) 1 ( ) 1 (    (9’) 
where:

















nor u u u    ' .
Equation (9`) gives the number of workers hired in excess of the number of workers 
required by technology.





np u u u  
1 ), the total number of excess workers that can be dismissed at 
time t  is 
t
np
t xef p t
np
nor t xef p t
xef u z c hc u z c c u '    '    
 ) 1 ( ) 1 (







nor u u u    '
1 . From (9’) it results that a decrease or, respectively, an 
increase in this number is given by 
t
np
t xef p t





np u are lower than 
np
nor u .
Equations (8) and (9`) and (9``) show that the unemployment rate depends on 
t
np L
(which in turn depends on demand), as also shown by equation (6), but also on z
and xef c , reflecting the presence or absence of norms and efficiency reserves. If 
1   z  or  nor t u u t  (that is, in the absence of norms), given the production level, the 
number of workers is set by technology. If  0   z  and  nor t u u   (that is, in the 
presence of norms), the number of workers with key qualifications is set by 
technology, but the actual number of auxiliary workers is set by both technology and 
norms.Institute for Economic Forecasting
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p t t u L ) c ( ) u ( L 1 1  if 0 z   , nor t u u  and 0 z '
t
np u  (10),
  t Y
t
np
p xef t xef t xef L ) c ( ) u ( L  K    K   K 1 1  if  1 z    or  nor t u u t  and  0 z '
t
np u    (11),
1  t Y      if 
1 1 t     
t
xef
t u u u  and  0   '
t
np u    (12), 
where: the constant  K  is the labor productivity in the presence of norms. 
Equation (10) specifies the production function when firms have efficiency reserves 
and equation (11) specifies the production function when firms have no efficiency 
reserves
8. Both equations show that the firm’s output depends on the number of 
employees. Equation (12) shows that using the efficiency reserves leaves production 
unchanged.
The alternation between equations (10) and (11) is determined by the cyclical 
movement of demand and by supply shocks which ‘unveils’ firm’s efficiency reserves. 
Once adopted, norms operate as long as  nor t u u   and are not canceled by firms in 
response to a shock ( 0   z ). If  0   z and demand increases or decreases within 
limits that leave the inequality  nor t u u   valid, the production function is given by 
equation (10). We assume that this lasts for i  consecutive periods ( 1 t i  is an 
integer), after which demand decreases sufficiently for  nor t u u t and norms are 
cancelled. If for l  periods ( 1 t l  is an integer) demand increases or decreases so that 
nor t u u t , the production function is given by equation (11). Firms reestablish norms 
after l  periods, when demand increases again high enough so that  nor t u u   and the 
cycle repeats itself. 
A supply shock that leads firms to cancel norms and use the efficiency reserves at 
time t , when  nor t u u  , remains in the memory of firms for i  consecutive periods 
(here 1 t i  shows the number of consecutive periods in which  nor t u u   after the 
shock). Thus, if  1   z  and demand increases or falls within limits that leave the 
inequality nor t u u   valid for i  consecutive periods, the production function is given by 
equation (11). If after i  consecutive periods, employment falls for l  consecutive 
periods, so that  nor t u u t , production is also given by equation (11). Firms reestablish 
norms once demand increases enough for  nor t u u  , so that the production function is 
again given by equation (10). 
                                                          
8 This definition is consistent with the idea that labor productivity is constant as long as the firm 
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The cyclical evolution of aggregate demand that leads firms to establish or cancel 
norms, and/or a supply shock that reduces the surplus per worker left to the firm, 
produces shocks in unemployment rate and labor productivity.
With respect to the business cycle, 
xef u  is a measure of the shock to the 
unemployment rate at the time when the unemployment rate drops below  nor u  and 
firms establish norms, or, alternatively, at the time when the unemployment rate 




p u c '  r 1 ) that causes unemployment rate to move from  nor t u u ! 1  to 






xef p p t t u c hc c u u '       1 1  with   1 , 0  h  and   1 , 0  t u  (13) 
From (13) it results that a change in the unemployment rate in response to a change 





xef p p t t u c c c u u '       1 1  if  0   z  and  nor t u u   (14) 




p t t u c u u '      1 1  if  1   z  or  nor t u u t  (15) 
Equations (14) and (15) show that  changes in demand entail  relatively large changes 
in the unemployment rate if employment is higher than 
np
nor L  and norms are in place, 
as compared to the situation in which employment is equal to or falls below this level 
and norms are cancelled. Absent norms, a change in the unemployment rate reflects 
only a change in demand. When norms are present, a change in the unemployment 
rate reflects both a change in demand and a change in the number of excess workers.
In the case of a supply shock that leads firms to dismiss excess workers 
(instantaneous use of efficiency reserves), by leaving the production level unchanged, 
the shock 
1  t
xef u  to the unemployment rate is given by the equation (9`) and satisfies 
the equation: 
1 1     
t
xef
t t u u u  (16) 
where: t u  is the unemployment rate after the shock (when there are no efficiency 
reserves left, and therefore 
t
P
t u u   ) and  1  t u  is the unemployment rate at the time of 
                                                          
9 This is obtained by subtracting ecuation (10) at time t  from ecuation (10) at time  1  t  and 
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the shock (when efficiency reserves still existed, and therefore 
t
R
t u u   1 ). Equation 
(16) shows the increase in unemployment rate due exclusively to the use of efficiency 
reserves. 
At the time t  when norms are removed (including due to shocks), labor productivity 
jumps to the constant level  xef K  to satisfy the relation: 
   t t xef t t u u I           1 1 1 1 K K K K K
, where 
1 1     
t
xef
t t u u u  (17) 
Given the efficiency reserves and the wage level, the firms set prices to maximize 
profit. Once the prices are set by each firm, the demand for the products of a firm is 
given by equation (2). Knowing that, at equilibrium, demand is equal to production, the 
level of production is implicitly determined. 
2.2. Wage setting 
The wage is set through a Nash-bargaining between each firm and its workers, in the 
absence of any rigidity concerning the nominal wage. This is the notional wage. The 
notional wage is the generalized Nash solution when firms and workers bargain over 
wages, but not employment. 
The real notional wage is set at a level that concomitantly maximizes both the firm’s 
surplus (
- 1 a
f S ) and the workers’ surplus (
a
e S ). Thus, the real notional wage in a 




f S S Max
- 1    (18) 
where: a  stands for the  bargaining power of labor, which can range between 0 and 
1.
Accordingly, the firms’ bargaining power is  a  1 . In condition (18), the surpluses left 
to  firms and employees, as well as the bargaining power, need to be defined. 
We begin by defining the bargaining power as a function of the unemployment rate. 
2.2.1. Bargaining power and the unemployment rate 
In most macroeconomic models, all employees are assumed to have a constant 
bargaining power. In this model we assume that only workers with key qualifications 
for the firm own niche have bargaining power, while auxiliary workers do not
10.
If only workers with key qualifications have bargaining power, we can admit that the 




np u L '    ' , similarly to 
variations in production level. Since 
t
np u '  depends on changes in the aggregate 
                                                          
10 The assumption is backed by the “competitive approach” to wage setting in the labor market. 
According to this approach, some of the unemployment is simply a consequence of diminished 
opportunities in the labor market for some workers relative to their reservation wage. 
“Especially at the bottom end of the skill distribution, workers have little or no bargaining power 
because they can be replaced easily” (Blanchard, 1997, p. 54).   Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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demand, then the variations in the bargaining power of labor depend on fluctuations in 
aggregate demand too, similarly to variations in production. 
Given labor productivity, the higher the aggregate demand the stronger the labor force 
demand and the bargaining power of labor. The latter reaches its maximum ( 1   a ) if 
t
np u  is equal to or below a critical value  np
a u 1    ( np
a t
np u u 1   d , with  0 1 !  
np
a u ). Conversely, 
the workers’ bargaining power reaches its minimum ( 0   a ) if aggregate demand is 
low enough for the unemployment rate of the workers with key qualifications to be 
equal to or higher than the critical value  np
nor
np








a u u 0 1 0       ). Wage bargaining occurs within the interval  >@ np
a
np
a u , u 0 1     .
Within this interval, the distance at time t  of the workers’ bargaining power from its 
maximum ( t a  1 ) is a function of the distance of 
t
np u  from 
np


















a u u u 1 1        ' , and M  is a positive coefficient showing the intensity of 
the relation between a  and  t
np
a u 1   ' . The restriction  >@ 1 0, a   yields that  >@ M  '   1 0 1 , u t
np
a ,




a u u .
This interval matches a range expressed in terms of the current unemployment rate. 
According to (13), if  0   z  the interval is >@ max min u , u , its length is 




nor u u h      . According to (15), 
if 1   z , this interval is >@ max min u u ,
1 , its length is > @   M 1 1
1
p min max c u u     . min u  and 
1
min u  are the unemployment rates for which  1   a  and  max u  is the unemployment rate 
for which  0   a
11. Equation (8) guarantees that 
xef
min min u u u   





xef u u c c u 1       is the maximum amount of efficiency reserves accumulated in 
the bargaining interval. Thus, the bargaining power equation is as follows 
1   if   min t u u d  and  0 d '
t
np u                        (20) 
  t a  min t u u  O 1    if   max min t u u u ,   and  0 z '
t
np u              (21) 
0 if  O / 1  t min t u u   and 0 t '
t
np u            (22) 
1  t a    if 
1 1     
t
xef
t t u u u   and  0   '
t
np u           (23) 
                                                          
11  By definition, when the workers’ bargaining power is zero, the coefficient  0   xef c , which 
explains why the upper limit is the same for the two intervals. Institute for Economic Forecasting
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where: O  is a constant that simultaneously satisfies the restrictions 
  xef p p c hc c     1 M O  and   min u  t 1 1 O . The restriction  >@ 1 , 0  a  yields that 
>@ M 1 , 0   min t u u , that is the length of the bargaining interval is  O 1    min max u u .
If we do not allow for norms, the equation (23) does not hold any longer and the 
equations (20)-(22) have to be rewritten to replace O by 1 O  and  min u  by 
1
min u , where 
  p c    1 1 M O
12.
Equation (21) shows that, within the interval >@ max min u u , , the closer the current 
unemployment rate is to  min u , the stronger the bargaining power of labor and vice 
versa. Equation (23) shows that during a shock that triggers the use of efficiency 
reserves, the bargaining power stays put.
The upper limit of the interval in which the bargaining power is transferred between 
employees and the firm depends on O  (equation (21)). The higherO , the smaller the 
interval >@ max min u , u  in which the bargaining power influences the wage setting
13. The 
employees and the firm have equal bargaining power when   2 max min t u u u    .
The bargaining power equation is consistent with the idea that on a depressed labor 
market, the workers’ bargaining power is small, as finding a job can prove difficult. 
This is reflected in the setting of a relatively low negotiated wage. Conversely, in a 
tight labor market, the workers’ bargaining power is high and the negotiated wage 
exceeds significantly the reservation wage. 
                                                          
12 The distance from  t u to  min u or to 
1
min u  is obtained by replacing 
t
np u ' in equations (13) and 
(15) with  t
np
a u 1   ' and solving for the latter.  The value obtained for  t
np
a u 1   '  is replaced in 
equation (19) and the workers’ bargaining power is obtained in terms of the deviation 
1
min t u u  . The bargaining power for the definition interval is 
   
xef
min t min t t u u u u u a          1
1
1 1 1 O O , where    p c    1 1 M O . In order to write this 
expression exclusively in terms of  min t u u  , we must make sure that 
  ) ( 1 1
1
1 min max min max t u u u u a         O O . This equality is valid if    xef p p c hc c     1 M O .
13 In turn, the lowerO , the higher  p c  and  xef c . Thus, the larger the efficiency reserves, the 
wider the interval of the unemployment rates for which a  and  min u ut   are determined.  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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2.2.2. The workers’ and firms’ surplus 
Assuming that  0   z , >  nor min t u u u ,   and that the capital is firm-specific, having no 
alternative use, the surplus per worker left to the firm is
14
  t s t min t t t t t f W L u f p L D p S      K 1  (24) 
where: t s W  is the nominal wage received by the worker,  t D  is the demand for the 
representative firm’s output,  f  is a constant that represents the ratio of the fixed costs 
of production
15 to the value of output when the unemployment rate is  min u .
The worker’s surplus is given by the difference between wage  t s W  paid by the firm 
and the expected wage. The latter is equal to the arithmetical mean of the economy-
wide average nominal wage,  t W , weighted by the likelihood  t u  1   he or she will be 
employed and the reservation wage,  t S , which approximates the value of leisure, 
weighted by the likelihood  t u  he or she will be unemployed. Considering that s  is the 
constant ratio of the reservation wage to the nominal value of production per unit of 
labor (  L Y p S s t t   , then the reservation wage can be written as  t t p s S K   ,
where K s  is the reservation wage in real terms. Thus, the worker’s surplus is given 
by:
  t t t t t s t e p s u u W W S K      1  (25) 
According to the intra-temporal optimality condition setting the marginal rate of 
substitution between leisure and consumption, the expected wage should fulfill the 
condition  K F
V I s u u p W C L t t t t t t    
 1 . This means that the worker’s 
surplus will be positive only if  K s p W t t ! .
With values of  f S  and e S  given by equations (24) and (25), condition (18) becomes 
      >@
t a
t t t t st
a
t t min t t t t p s u u W W W L u f p L D p K K    u    1 1 Max
t - 1
s  (26) 
with the bargained real notional wage ( t t s st p W w   ) for which this condition is 
fulfilled given by: 
  >@    >@ K K s u u p W a L p u f p D p a w t t t t t t t t t t t t         1 1 1 min s  (27) 
                                                          
14 A similar definition is presented by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), in which 
t f S  is defined 
in terms of
* u . To keep the equations simple, we decided to define
t f S  in relation to min u .
15 We could exclude  f from the definition of the firm’s surplus, but we considered necessary to 
keep it, as in the case of prices of certain products like software, medicines, etc., the fixed 
costs hold a larger share than the marginal ones, so that the price reflects more the mark-up 
rather than the marginal costs. Institute for Economic Forecasting
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In equation (27)  p W  represents the economy-wide average real wage. The real 
notional wage ( t s w ) is a weighted arithmetical mean of the firm’s real variable cost per 
worker and the real opportunity cost of the worker. According to equation (21), the 
weights of these costs in real wage formation depend on the difference  min t u u  for as 
long as the difference ranges within the interval  O / ,1 0 . In accordance with 
equations (21), (24), (25) and (27), when the difference  min t u u  is zero, the firm’s 
surplus equals zero as well. Conversely, if  O 1    min t u u , the worker’s surplus is 
zero. Obviously, if  1   z  or  nor t u u t , there are no longer any norms or efficiency 
reserves, so that equations (24), (25), (26) and (27) should be rewritten to substitute 
K , min u , and O  by  xef K ,
1
min u  and  1 O respectively. This outlines that when norms are 
in place, the negative relation between the real wage and the unemployment rate 
takes place at lower levels of real wages, as compared to the case when norms are 
missing. 
2.3. Equilibrium with flexible prices 
For the representative firm, the labor market equilibrium is reached at the intersection 
of supply and demand equations. The demand equation results from the price setting 
process conducted by firms, while the supply equation results from the wage-setting 
mechanism. Both processes depend on the real wage. Further in this section we write 
the labor demand and supply equations and introduce the natural rate of 
unemployment.
2.3.1. Demand and supply equations on the labor market 
Assuming further that  0   z  and  >  nor min t u u u ,  , a firm that produces final goods 
will set the price p  in order to maximize the difference 
  
ȕ ȕ / 1 / Max
   t t t t t t t t p p C W p p C p K  (28) 
where:  K 1 t W  is the nominal marginal cost of the firm. Under flexible prices, all firms 
will set the same price, so that the difference in equation (28) reaches its maximum for 
a constant value of the real wage t d t t w p W  
16 equal to 
                                                          
16 Equation (29) can be derived by making the distinction between the firms producing final 
goods, facing monopolistic competition, and the firms producing intermediary goods, facing 
perfect competition. Profit maximization by firms producing intermediary goods is conditional 
on the equality between real marginal revenue product of labor and real marginal cost: 
w P P
I   K , where 
I P is the price of the intermediary good and  P  is the price index 
associated with C . Profit maximization by firms producing final goods requires that
I P P P   .
By replacing the value of P  in the previous equation, we obtain equation (29).  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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 µ Ș ȕ ȕ Ș w t d      1  (29) 
where:  P E E   1  represents the optimal gross markup that the firm adds to the 
nominal marginal cost. 
Equation (29) represents the labor demand equation. It describes the wage that is 
consistent with the willingness of firms to hire, given the general conditions regarding 
input prices, the tax system, interest rates etc., and the condition that firms make zero 
economic profit. Equation (29) is consistent with the idea that real wages are neutral 
to the business cycle. The constant value of the real wage results from both the 
constant price elasticity of demand in equation (2) and the assumption that labor 
productivity is constant. The higher the labor productivity or the price elasticity of 
demand, the higher the wage t d w . From the definition of nominal marginal cost it 
results that µ Ș w t d 1    is the real marginal cost of the firm.
As real wage equation that results from the price setting mechanism gives labor 
demand, the real wage equation resulting from the wage setting process provides the 
labor supply equation. Noting that, at 
equilibrium, Y D   , p p   ,  E E K 1    p W  and taking into account equations 
(20)-(22), then equation (27) of the notional real wage per worker will read as follows:
 >@    >@      >@ s u u u u u u f u u w t t min t t min min t t s             E E K O K O 1 1 1 1 1 1  (30) 
Equation (30) shows the negative non-linear dependence of the real wage on the 
unemployment rate for   O / u u , u u min max min t 1      and if  0 z
t
np u ' . The real wage 
curve on supply side,  t s w , reflects market forces and the will of workers and firms. 
Outside the interval >@ max min u u , , the firms’ and workers’ surplus cannot be 
simultaneously positive and the work relations are privately inefficient. To make sure 
that the two surpluses are positive, the real wage must satisfy the condition: 
    >@  f w s u u t s min min xef  d d      1 1 1 1 1 K O E E O K . If  1   z , this 
condition can be rewritten with K  being replaced by  xef K . Likewise, if  1   z or
nor t u u t , equations (29) and (30) have to be rewritten by replacing K , min u , and O
by xef K ,
1
min u  and  1 O respectively.   
Under perfectly flexible prices and wages, the equilibrium between  t d w and t s w  is 
reached at the natural rate of unemployment. Our model shows that the equilibrium 
wage is influenced by the business cycle, which determines firms to establish/cancel 
norms or by a shock that reduces the surplus left with the firm from each worker. 
When firms establish norms ( 1    t nor t u u u ), labor productivity drops from  xef K  to 
K  and the wages given by equations (29) and (30) are equal at a relatively low level. 
When firms cancel norms ( t nor t u u u   1 ) or a supply-side shock takes place, labor Institute for Economic Forecasting
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productivity returns to the  xef K , while wages grow to the levels indicated by equations 
(29) and (30) adjusted for productivity
17 and for 
1
min u  and  1 O .
According to equation (13), (17) and (30), a change in demand that causes the 
unemployment rate to move from  nor t u u ! 1  to  nor t u u   or vice versa, from 
nor t u u  1  to  nor t u u ! , determines a disruption of the negative relation between 
wages and unemployment. The disruption occurs because of the labor productivity 
jump to a new constant level that occurs (equation (17)) when the unemployment rate 
(equation (13)) drops below or increases beyond (or equals)  nor u , which is the trigger 
for norms establishing/cancelling. When this happens, the unemployment rate and the 
wage (equation (30)) decrease or, respectively, increase together 
(( ) ( ) ( 1 t t t t u w u w !  or ) ( ) ( 1 t t t t u w u w   ).
Equations (16), (17) and (30) indicate that a disruption of the negative wage-
unemployment rate relation also occurs when firms respond to a supply-side shock by 
dismissing excess workers. This response leads to an increase in the unemployment 
rate (equation (16)) and determines a jump of labor productivity to a higher constant 
level (equation (17)) and thus an increase in the real wage (equation (30) or (30) 
adjusted). After each of the two possible disruptions, the negative wage-
unemployment rate relation resumes.
2.3.2. The natural rate of unemployment and the norms 
In this section we first show that the natural rate of unemployment depends on the 
reservation wage, the ratio of fixed costs of production to the value of production, the 
length of the negotiation interval and the price elasticity of demand, but not on norms. 
Then we show the relation between these parameters that secures positive surpluses 
for the representative firm and each of its workers. Finally, we show that while norms 
do not influence the level of the natural rate of unemployment, they alter the meaning 
of the unemployment rate gap by reducing its capacity to reflect aggregate demand 
excess or deficit.
To identify the natural rate of  unemployment’s determinants we use equation (29) for 
the real wage consistent with profit maximization and equation (30) for the real wage 
resulting from the wage setting process, written by replacing  min u   and O  by 
1
min u  and 
1 O respectively, to obtain the expression for the  real marginal cost (MC ):





Since the real marginal cost does not change when labor productivity moves from 
xef K  to K  and vice versa, the equation (31) written as above equals the equation (31) 
                                                          
17 The decrease/increase in wages that accompanies norms’ adoption/cancelation by firms is 
explained by the increase/decrease in the weight of auxiliary workers that are paid lower 
wages than the workers with key qualifications.  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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written by replacing 
1
min u  and  1 O  by  min u   and O  by respectively. This means that the 
natural rate of unemployment is not influenced by norms’ establishment/cancelation. 
The natural rate of unemployment is that value of the unemployment rate, 
* u , for 
which equation (31) equals equation (29) divided by K . It depends on parameters  f ,
s , 1 O , and E . Given the parameters f , s , O , the natural rate of unemployment 
depends on the optimal gross markup each firm adds to its marginal cost,P , which 
depends in turn on E  (  1    E E P ). Ceteris paribus, the lower the markup, the 
lower the natural rate of unemployment and closer to  min u . As Blanchard says, “How 
markups move, in response to what, and why, is however nearly terra incognita for 
macro” (2008, p. 18).
To identify correlations between parameters f , s , 1 O , and E   we start from the fact 
that, in accordance with equation (21), the difference  min t u u   has an impact on wage 
bargaining if the former ranges within the interval >@ O 1 0, . This condition is met if the 
price elasticity of demand ranges within the interval  >@ f , s 1 1 1 
18. If f 1   E , then 
min t u u   . This situation is little likely to occur because the firm’s surplus from each 
worker would be zero. If   s    1 1 E , then  max t u u  
19. This case is also little likely 
to materialize, as the surplus of each worker would be zero. If    f , s 1 1 1   E ,
then t u  ranges between  min u  and  max u . In this case, the firm’s and workers’ 
surpluses are positive. 
Since it makes sense for firm’s and workers’ surpluses to be at least zero at the 
natural rate of unemployment, then  >@ max min
* u , u u  . This means that the bargaining 
power of workers reaches its maximum at an unemployment rate equal to or lower 
than the natural rate of unemployment. The lower the difference  min
* u u  , the higher 
the workers’ bargaining power at the natural rate of unemployment. The rationales set 
                                                          
18 0    min t u u  if the difference between the wage on the supply side according to equation (30) 
calculated for  min t u u    and the wage on the demand side according to equation (29) equals 
zero. Thus,   >@ 0 1 1      E E K f if f 1   E . Also,  O 1    min t u u  if the difference between 
equation (30), calculated for  max t u u   , and equation (29) equals zero. Thus, 
    >@  0 1 1 1 1 1          E E K O E E O K s u u min min if  s    1 1 E . In this case, the 
workers’ bargaining power at the natural rate of unemployment is zero. The two combined 
restrictions support the assertion in the text. It can be shown that   f s 1 1 1 !   if  f s  1 .
19 This means that at  max u the real wage on the supply side in equation (30) equals the real 
wage on the demand side in equation (29) only if the latter is equal to the reservation wage. Institute for Economic Forecasting
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forth in this section are also valid if norms are no longer in place. In this case, the 
natural rate of unemployment ranges within the interval >@ max min u u ,
1 .
To discuss the issue of unemployment rate gaps, let us note again with 
t
R u  any 
unemployment rate lower than  nor u  when norms are in place ( 0   z ), like in equation 
(8). It is reasonable to assume that the natural rate of unemployment is lower than  






R R u u u u u u       
* * ˆ . In this relation, 




P     is the demand-
related unemployment rate gap that reflects excess/deficit demand. Thus, given (9’), if 
t
R u ˆ  and 
t






R u u u    ˆ ˆ  (32`). 
If
t
R u ˆ  and 
t
P u ˆ  are positive, given (9’’) we can write: 
1 ˆ ˆ






R u u u  (32``). 
Equations (32`) and (32``) show that unemployment rate gaps when norms are in 
place consist of a demand-related  unemployment rate gap reflecting excess demand 
or a deficit demand, respectively, and a norms-related component, reflecting efficiency 
reserves. A shock that leads to excess workers layoffs leaves the demand-related 





P u ˆ . Thus, norms make it possible for the unemployment rate to increase 
without any change in the demand-related unemployment rate gap. 






xef R u u c c u u      
* * *
ˆ . The last expression is a particular writing of 
equation (8) when the economy is at full employment, that is when 
t
P u  is equal to 
* u :
* * * xef R u u u     (33).   
Equation (33) says that when norms are in place, the natural rate of unemployment 
has an image in terms of the current rate of unemployment, which is equal to the 
natural rate of unemployment when norms are not in place minus 
* xef u . This means 
that when the demand-related unemployment rate gap is equal to zero, a shock that 
results in dismissing all excess workers causes the actual unemployment rate to 
increase to its natural level. Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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3. The bargaining power and the temporary 
alternative wage setting mechanism 
The presence of a surplus associated with existing employment relationships means 
that any path of the real wage that allows for  0 t t e S  and  0 t
t f S for all t  is 
consistent with equilibrium (Hall, 2005 and Blanchard and Gali, 2008). Nash-
bargaining generates one of such paths. 
In this section we show that if the bargaining power of workers is significantly higher 
than that of the firm, Nash-bargaining can be temporarily replaced by an alternative 
wage setting mechanism (AWSM). This temporary mechanism leads to a 
simultaneous growth of the real wage and the unemployment rate. We first show 
under what conditions workers can use their bargaining power to increase the real 
wage above the notional wage. Then, we present the wage growth rate a firm can 
accommodate without reducing its surplus. 
3.1. The bargaining power and the unemployment gap 
One reason why workers would want to use their bargaining power to increase the 
real wage above the notional real wage could be information asymmetry (Acemoglu, 
1995). If they have imperfect information regarding the total surplus associated with 
the employment relationship, workers could demand excessive increases of their 
wages. Another reason could be the anticipation by workers that the increase in 
inflation that follows monetary or fiscal policy easing can alter the surplus allocation by 
reducing the workers’ surplus.
There are two conditions to be simultaneously met if workers are to use their 
bargaining power to demand a real wage higher than the notional real wage. First, the 
actual unemployment rate must be equal to or lower than the natural rate of 
unemployment (
* * xef
t u u u  d ). If this condition is not fulfilled, there is available 
labor force willing to work for a wage equal to the notional wage. If 
* * xef
t u u u  d ,
then there is no more available labor force willing to work for the notional wage. Thus, 
workers gain the power to demand wage increases above the notional wage level, 
and may want to give up Nash-bargaining. 
Second, the workers’ bargaining power must be higher than that of the firm (which 
means that   2 max min t u u u   ) and the actual rate of unemployment must be 
sufficiently close to  min u . Let    2 max min min x u u , u u    be the maximum value of the 
unemployment rate at which workers can impose wages higher than the notional 
wage. This means that the AWSM can be triggered when   @ x min t u u u ,  .
Together, the two conditions imply that 
* u must be close enough to  min u . The two 
unemployment rates are sufficiently close if given the parameters  min u , f ,s  andOInstitute for Economic Forecasting
 Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 3/2011 232
(the latter depending on M , p c and xef c ), the markupP  is small enough, reflecting 




min u u u u    ,
* * xef u u  could be higher 
than, lower than or equal to  x u . By combining the two conditions, it results that the 
workers’ bargaining power can be used for wage increases above the wage notional 
level if 
* * xef
x t u u u u  d d  or if  x
xef
t u u u u d  d
* * .
The case where  x
xef
t u u u u d   
* * shows clearly that the real wage could rise 
above the notional wage due to the workers’ high bargaining power, although there is 
no excess aggregate demand. Obviously, in the case of an inflationary unemployment 
rate gap ( x
xef
t u u u u d  
* *  or 
* * xef
x t u u u u   d ), the probability of high 
bargaining power being used for increasing the real wage above the notional wage is 
even higher. 
The cases described above are essential from the perspective of this paper. They 
allow us to show the microeconomic rationale of shifting to an AWSM, which leads to 
the simultaneous increase in the real wage and the unemployment rate. Further on, 
we show this rationale.
3.2. The positive correlation between the real wage and the 
unemployment rate
The AWSM consists of an increase in the real wage above the notional real wage 
accompanied by layoffs of excess workers. The rationale behind shifting to a new 
mechanism is the following: if workers use their high bargaining power to increase the 
real wage above the notional real wage, the firm decides to pay the increased wages 
in order to prevent shirking (as defined by Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), which would 
lead to reduced labor productivity
20. Ceteris paribus, the surplus per worker left to the 
firm decrease, which is equivalent to a shock that ‘unveils’ the firm’s efficiency 
reserves. To accommodate higher wage costs, the firm decides to use these 
reserves. Since efficiency reserves are limited, the AWSM is temporary. 
Unemployment rate rises according to equation (16) while production and the 
bargaining power remain unchanged as stated in equations (12) and (23), 
respectively.  
The real wage a firm can pay to a worker without altering its own surplus per worker or 
the workers’ surplus, when the unemployment rate increases according to equation 
(16), should satisfy the surplus maximization condition (18). In the absence of norms 
(z = 1) and taking into account the level of the bargaining power defined by equations 
(20)-(22) and that, at equilibrium,  Y D   , p p   , u L   1 , and   E  E K   1 p W , the 
real wage that satisfies condition (18) is given by equation (30) adjusted, withK  being 
replaced by  xef K .
                                                          
20 Here we assume that some firms cannot push up prices in order to accommodate wage 
increases. At least these firms use the efficiency reserves to preserve their surpluses.  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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The real wage given by the adjusted equation (30), in the absence of norms, is 
K K K xef I    times higher than the real wage indicated by equation (30), in the 
presence of norms. This means that when unemployment rate increases exclusively 
on account of excess workers layoffs, the real wage should grow by an index 
(
1   
t s t s s w w I ) equal to K I  in order for the surpluses of the firm and workers to 
remain maximum. 
If K I Is   , the demand-related unemployment rate gap and the real marginal cost are 
preserved. This means that at the time of the AWSM adoption, the following changes 
occur at the level of the wage and the actual unemployment 
rate:    >@ t t t s t u u w w       1 1 1 1 s  (according to equation (17)), and 
1 1     
t
xef
t t u u u  (according to equation (16)). Shifting to the AWSM is possible 
anywhere in the range >@
* *
min,
xef u u u   if 
* * xef
x t u u u u  d d  or if 
x
xef
t u u u u d  d
* * .
4. The unemployment rate and inflation 
In this section we introduce sticky prices in our model and investigate the implications 
of norms and of the AWSM on the relation between inflation and unemployment rate. 
In line with much of the recent literature on monetary business cycle models, we 
consider the sticky price á la Calvo (1983). Thus, in each period, only part of final 
producers ( T  1 ), selected randomly, change their prices, while the remaining final 
producers (T ) keep prices unchanged: 
  
E E E T T


     
1
1
1 * 1 1 t t t p p p  (34) 
where:
*
t p  is the new price set by the firm at time t . The optimal rule of price setting 
for a firm that re-sets prices at time t  is
   >@ 0 1
* * 1 *
0

















    t i t
i
i t t C C A ,  is the discount factor, and MC is the real marginal 
cost. 
From equations (34) and (35), after log-linearization around the steady state level of 
inflation rate equal to zero, we obtain the inflation rate (S )
21, which in view of equation 
(31) takes the form 
t t t t u E ˆ 1 NJ S G S      (36) 
                                                          
21 A demonstration is provided by Carl E. Walsh (2003). Institute for Economic Forecasting
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where: t u ˆ J  is the deviation of the real marginal cost from its trend, 
* ˆ u u u t     is the 
demand-related unemployment rate gap,  T T GT N / ) 1 )( 1 (     , ^` 1  t t E S  is the 
inflation expected at t  for  1  t , and





1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 min min min u u s u u u f           E O O J .
Equation (36) represents the supply side of the economy. In the form presented 
herein, it relates the demand-related unemployment rate gap to inflation. In order for it 
to close, our model needs a demand equation. Following the steps indicated in Walsh 
(2003), it can be proved that the demand equation takes the form 
   t t t t t t t E r u E b u b \ S V J J       
 
1 1
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ  (37), 
where: I V    b ,    >@  t t t t E K K I V I \ ˆ ˆ 1 1        depends only on exogenous 
productivity disturbances that impact demand and supply, such as a change in 
technology, and  t K ˆ   is the deviation of  labor productivity from its trend. Once the 
behavior of the nominal rate of interest is specified, equations (36) and (37) give a 
model for inflation and the unemployment rate gap, representing the general 
equilibrium conditions of the model.
Equation (36) allows us to show that the monetary policy effects on the unemployment 
rate- inflation relation depend on the presence/absence of norms. According to 
equation (14), the response of the unemployment rate to a change in the monetary 
policy stance is relatively large if employment is relatively high ( ) nor t u u  and norms 
are in place ( 0   z ). However, according to equation (15), the response of the 
unemployment rate is relatively low for low levels of employment ( nor t u u t ) or if 
norms are not in place ( 1   z ). The varying size of the unemployment rate response, 
which ultimately depends on the presence/absence of norms, can explain the 
counterintuitive fact that, sometimes (Fair, 1999), for relatively high levels of 
employment the Philips curve is relatively flatter
22.
To show the implications of the AWSM on the inflation-unemployment relation, we 
assume the economy is at the natural rate of unemployment. Adopting the AWSM 
means that the actual unemployment rate grows as described in equation (16) to its 
natural level, as required by equality (33). The real wage also increases from its low 
level given by equation (30) to the higher level  MC xef K . These increases in the 
unemployment rate and in the real wage leave the demand-related unemployment 
rate gap and thus the real marginal cost gap unchanged (both remaining equal to 
zero), having no impact on inflation. Equation (36) allows us to show that what 
happens to inflation depends on the trigger of the AWSM adoption.
                                                          
22 This could also explain some uncorrelated moves between the (natural) rate of unemployment 
and inflation, as shown by Tobin (1993), Eisner (1996), Galbraith (1997), Gordon (1997), 
Stiglitz (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Coen, Eisner, Marlin, Shah (1999), Ball and   
Mankiw  (2002).  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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If the trigger is information asymmetry, inflation rate remains unchanged. The final 
result is a higher unemployment rate at the same inflation. However, a monetary 
policy easing aiming at bringing the unemployment rate back to the low level that 
preceded the AWSM adoption generates a negative demand-related unemployment 
rate gap, which in turn causes inflation to increase. As it is unsustainable at the new 
level, the unemployment rate returns to its natural level. Finally, the economy is 
functioning at relatively high levels of wages, inflation and unemployment rates. 
Wages and unemployment rates remain relatively high until the conditions for 
adopting norms are met again. 
Alternatively, if the trigger of the AWSM adoption is an anticipation of a monetary 
policy easing, inflation expectations emerge and inflation increases due to the 
component 1  t t E S  in equation (36). Thus, the anticipation of a monetary policy easing 
that leads to the AWSM adoption triggers the simultaneous growth of the 
unemployment rate and inflation. If no monetary policy decision is taken, real interest 
rate falls, causing aggregate demand to increase and the unemployment rate to 
temporally decrease before stabilizing to its natural level. 
However, if the monetary authority confirms expectations by an actual policy easing 
that reverses the growth of the unemployment rate implied by the AWSM, the 
combined final result is only higher inflation since the unemployment rate increases 
back to its natural level. This result is in line with the results presented by Kidland and 
Prescott (1977), Baro and Gordon (1983) and others.
It is reasonable to assume that firms that change prices ( T  1 ) choose to pass the 
wage growth to prices. In this case, the use of efficiency reserves is a gradual 
process. In a first stage, only firms that do not change prices (T ) adopt the AWSM. 
Thus, inflation and the unemployment rate will rise simultaneously. In the following 
stages, firms that did not use the efficiency reserves would want to use them as their 
competitors that did so choose to increase prices. This pushes the unemployment rate 
higher. However, because firms that change prices are selected randomly, it remains 
uncertain if inflation and the unemployment rate increase simultaneously in the 
following adjustment stages. 
5. Conclusions 
The model presented in this paper shows that if firms set norms that entail hiring 
auxiliary workers in excess and the workers’ bargaining power depends on demand, 
then the negative relation between inflation and the unemployment rate can be 
temporarily interrupted. In the presence of norms, labor productivity, the 
unemployment rate and the real wage are relatively low. Besides the natural rate of 
unemployment, there are other levels of the unemployment rate that are relevant to 
monetary policy decisions. 
The unemployment rate  nor u , below which firms set norms, is relevant to changes in 
labor productivity and to the effects on the unemployment rate of a change in the 
monetary policy stance. When the unemployment rate falls below  nor u , firms establish Institute for Economic Forecasting
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norms that entail excess workers. This produces a drop in both the unemployment 
rate, irrespective of changes in aggregate demand, and labor productivity. Conversely, 
when the unemployment rate becomes equal to (or higher than)  nor u , firms cancel 
norms. Workers in excess are dismissed, which determines an abrupt increase in the 
unemployment rate and pushes labor productivity to a higher constant level. Without 
norms, the unemployment rate becomes exclusively reliant on changes in aggregate 
demand. Thus, establishing/cancelling norms has consequences for macroeconomic 
policies. Monetary policy targeting a certain adjustment in the current inflation causes 
changes in the unemployment rate that are larger when norms are in place 
( nor t u u  ), as compared to the opposite situation. 
The unemployment rate at which the bargaining power of workers reaches a 
maximum, min u , may be relevant to the inflation-unemployment relation and to 
monetary policy. Its relevance becomes manifest when the effective rate of 
unemployment is equal to (or lower than) the natural rate of unemployment and 
sufficiently close to  min u . Ceteris paribus, the lower the markup monopolistic firms add 
to the marginal cost, the lower the natural rate of unemployment, and thus the closer 
to min u .
When these conditions are met, workers, by using their high bargaining power, can 
force the firm they work for to shift from a Nash-bargaining of wages to a temporary 
AWSM. This mechanism consists in increases in the wage beyond the notional wage 
(the workers have the power to impose this) accompanied by norms cancelation and 
layoff of all excess workers. The AWSM preserves the proportion to which a firm and 
its workers share the surplus associated with work relationships and interrupts 
temporarily the negative relation between inflation and the unemployment rate. 
Compared to their levels before the usage of efficiency reserves by firms, the wage, 
inflation, unemployment rate and labor productivity are relatively high until the 
condition for adopting norms is satisfied again. 
The reason behind the AWSM adoption is relevant to the inflation-unemployment 
relation. In order to show this, we assume the economy is at the natural rate of 
unemployment. If the AWSM adoption is caused by insufficient information workers 
have regarding the size of the surplus associated with work relationships, the 
unemployment rate will increase without any change in the demand-related 
unemployment rate gap and inflation. However, if the AWSM adoption is determined 
by workers’ expectations of monetary policy easing, inflation and the unemployment 
rate will increase simultaneously, while the demand-related unemployment gap will 
remain unchanged.
After dismissing excess workers, the inflation-unemployment rate relation turns 
negative again. In the short term, a monetary policy easing aimed at lowering 
unemployment rate back to the level seen before the usage of efficiency reserves 
increases the demand-related unemployment gap and, thus, inflation. As the 
unemployment rate is unsustainable at this level, it returns to its natural level.  Three Unemployment Rates Relevant To Monetary Policy 
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Monetary policy should not seek to counterbalance the shock to the unemployment 
rate produced by norms’ establishment/cancelation. However, in practice, it is difficult 
to identify those changes in the unemployment rate and labor productivity entailed by 
norms’ adoption/cancellation.
The norms and the AWSM can explain in part why the relation between inflation and 
unemployment rate is mysterious in the sense suggested by Mankiw (2000). They 
support the idea that the inflation-unemployment relation is influenced by the 
interaction between monetary policy and the labor market. On the one hand, the labor 
market influences the monetary policy effects on the relation between inflation rate 
and unemployment rate. In our model this occurs due to norms. On the other hand, 
the labor market is impacted by expectations regarding changes in monetary policy 
stance. In our model, such expectations determine the AWSM adoption, which leads 
to the simultaneous growth of inflation and unemployment.
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